This paper analyses the dynamic consequences of interest rate feedback rules in a flexible-price model where money enters the utility function. Two alternative rules are considered based on past or predicted inflation rates. The m a i nf e a t u r ei st oc o n s i d e ri n flation rates that are selected over a bounded time horizon. We prove that if the Central Bank's forecast horizon is not too long, an active and forward-looking monetary policy is not destabilizing: the equilibrium trajectory is unique and monotonic. This is an advantage with respect to active and backward-looking policies that are shown to lead to a unique but fluctuating dynamic. JEL Classification: E31, E43, E52.
Introduction
Since McCallum (1981) , monetary feedback rules have been studied to reestablish determinacy in monetary models (Bernanke and Woodford, 1997, Woodford, 2003) . The choices pertaining to the modeling of the variables' timing are particularly important in those models Fuerst, 2000, 2001) , and recommendations may vary depending on whether a discreteor continuous-time representation is chosen (Dupor, 2001 , Carlstrom and Fuerst, 2003 , 2005 . In this article, we study and extend a framework initially proposed by Benhabib (2004) that mix both representations. This is a continuous-time model with flexible prices and money in the utility function where the current nominal interest rates are set by a Central Bank according to a feedback rule, as in Benhabib et al. (2001) . The main featureisthatinterestratepolicyisnotdefined according to the current value of infla t i o n ,n o ro ni t sv a l u eo v e ra ni n finite horizon, but on its values over a finite horizon. With this assumption, the continuous-time model is more similar to traditional discrete-time models used in the literature. It turns out to be easier to solve. As recalled by Benhabib (2004) , with discrete-time frameworks, the order of the difference equation that describes the equilibrium increases with the number of lagged inflation rates. For instance, the Taylor rule based on inflation recorded over the last four quarters (Taylor, 1993 ) implies that dynamics are described by an equation of at least 4th order, which is difficult to study analytically. In continuous-time, considering a bounded backward-looking rule leads to a dynamic that is described by a delay differential equation. We show how to use recent mathematical results on functional differential equations (d' Albis et al. 2012 Albis et al. , 2013 ) to easily solve analytically the issue of the determinacy of the equilibrium in the framework developed by Benhabib (2004) . We also extend his analysis by considering a forward-looking rule that leads to an advance differential equation. According to Clarida et al. (1998 Clarida et al. ( , 2001 ), forward-looking rules seem to be more realistic while Orphanides (2001) show that they provide a better fit of real time data than current or backward-looking rules. However, advance differential equations are dramatically different from delay differential equations. The formers are characterized by an unstable manifold of infinite dimensions whereas it is the stable manifold of these latter that are of in- we fin dt h a tt h er u l ei sm o r ep r o n et oi n d e t e r m i n a c yw h e r e a sL e v i n eet al.
(2007) find the contrary in a sticky-price model. In Section 2, we present the model whose solution is studied in Sections 3 and 4, where we make the distinction between backward-looking and forwardlooking policies. Our conclusions are discussed in Section 5.
Feedback rules over a bounded horizon
We consider a model that is similar to those studied by Benhabib et al. (2001) and Benhabib (2004) . This is a flexible-price model where nominal interest rates are set by the Central Bank as a function of past or forecasted inflation rates. The novelty is to consider that backward and forward horizons of the Central Bank are bounded.
Time is continuous and is denoted by  ∈ R + .L e t () () and  () be respectively real consumption, real balances held for non-production purposes and real financial wealth. The household's problem is:
where 0 and 0 denote the rate of time preference and the output, Letting  () be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the household's instant budget constraint, the first order conditions are:
together with the household's instant budget constraint given in problem (1) and the transversality condition:
We assume that nominal interest rates are set by the Central Bank according to the following rule:
where   () and   () denote backward and forward indicators of inflation defined respectively by the weighted averages of past and expected future rates of inflation. The indicators write:
where Ω   0 and Ω   0 respectively denote the bounded backward and considers the following indicator:
Benhabib (2004) hence assumes that information about past inflation rates is obtained by the Central Bank after a delay while we assume that, after some time, information conveyed by past inflation rate is not considered as relevant by the Central Bank. Formally, the advantage of (8) In equilibrium, the goods market must clear, which writes:  ()= By replacing this equilibrium condition in (2) and (3), we obtain:
 Let us use the latter to define the implicit function  ()= ( ()) and replace it in the former. We differentiate with respect to time the new equation and rearrange using (4) to obtain:
with
The dynamics of the variables
characterized by a system composed of two algebraic equations given in (7), a static equation (6), and a differential equation (9) . We remark that the algebraic equations reduce to differential equations with a discrete delay or a discrete advance when differentiated once with respect to time.  () and  ()
are forward variables, with  (0 + ) and  (0 + ) that are not given. Initial conditions for these two variables hence write:
In principle, we also have
given. However, using the first equation of (7) computed for  =0 ,w es e et h a t  () is a backward variable whose initial condition is now:
and where   (0 + ) is given by the algebraic equation. This implies that
may be discontinuous at  =0 . Conversely, using (6) computed at  =0 , we see that   () is a forward variable with the following initial condition:
will have to be determined and will be possibly different from
For the perfect-foresight equilibrium we consider, it is implicitly assumed that the initial price level is given. More precisely, for all  ∈ [−Ω   0),t h e price level, denoted  ()  solves:
Hence, this is  (0 + ) (which is allowed to be different from  (0 − ))t h a t is arbitrarily chosen in our framework. It is well known since Sargent and Wallace (1975) that the initial price level cannot be determined in this type of model.
As in Benhabib et al. (2001)
, we are going to study the trajectories for which the inflation rate converges to a constant. We provide a local analysis of these trajectories and, therefore, restrict ourselves to neighborhoods of a steady-state defined as a collection ( *  * 
We assume 2 there exists a steady-state that satisfies:
It is also important (Benhabib et al. 2002 and Cochrane, 2011) to assume the uniqueness of the steady-state.
Since we consider functional equations, the Hartman-Grobman theorem does not apply to our problem, and we have to prove that studying the linearized system is not misleading. This is done by establishing the following result.
Lemma 1. In the neighborhood of the steady-state, the dynamics of the system of equations (6), (7) and (9) behave similarly to those of its linearized counterpart, provided that the latter is hyperbolic.
Proof. See Appendix.
The condition in Lemma 1 will be satisfied below. We now compare the dynamics induced by the choice of the Central Bank to follow either a backward-looking interest rate rule or a forward-looking one.
Backward-looking feedback rules
We consider the case where nominal interest rates are set by the Central
Bank as a function of past and present inflation rates. For   =0 ,t h e 2 Equivalently, we could have given straightforward conditions on the limits of function  that would be sufficient for existence of a real solution to (12) . Note also that since  0  0, existence implies uniqueness.
perfect-foresight equilibrium satisfies:
The system (13) is defined as a two dimensional system composed by an ordinary differential equation and an algebraic equation with a continuum of delays, which reduces to a delay differential equation when differentiated once with respect to time. There is one forward variable, (),a n do n e backward variable,   (), for which a discontinuity is allowed at  =0 ,a s (13) has
Proof. See Appendix. To see the importance of the bounded backward horizon on this result, we now consider the case where Ω  → +∞, which is also studied in Benhabib if  0 ( * ) ∈ (0 1),a n d
We see that the determinacy property is the same as in Lemma 2: there are multiple equilibria if the policy is passive but the equilibrium is unique if the policy is active. The finite delay has, thus, no impact on the determi- There is an assumption that is important in our setting. We assume that contemporaneous inflation is necessarily included in the interest rate rule, which formally comes from assumption:
and the problem is significantly modified as the nominal interest rate becomes a backward variable. 
M o r e o v e r ,u s i n g( 7 )a n d( 9 ) ,t h ed y n a m i c sr e d u c et oas i n g l ee q u a t i o nt h a t writes:
 ()= ⎛ ⎝ R  −Ω     (−) h  () −  0 () Λ(()) i  R 0 −Ω       −  ⎞ ⎠ (14)
Forward-looking feedback rules
We now consider the case where nominal interest rates are set by the Central Bank as a function of expected and present inflation rates. For   =0 ,t h e perfect-foresight equilibrium satisfies:
System (15) is similar to system (13) except that the algebraic equation includes advances rather than delays. Moreover, the two variables,  () and (15) has
Proof. See Appendix. (15) 
Lemma 5 implies that local indeterminacy of active monetary policies
with a forward-looking feedback rule are ruled out by choosing a not too long forecasting horizon. This result can also be interpreted by continuity.
Indeed, for Ω  =0, one gets a current-looking rule. Conversely, the case of an infinite horizon (which was analyzed by Benhabib et al. 2001 ) our sufficient condition is not satisfied and one may find multiple equilibria. This case is studied in the next Lemma.
To eliminate local indeterminacy, Lemma 6 suggests that the Central As an extension of this work, it could be interesting to turn to normative considerations and define the optimal rule that allows the Central Bank to achieve its objectives.
Appendix
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 . The system composed by equations (6), (7) and (9) rewrites as follows:
A Taylor approximation on the neighborhood of the steady-state transforms t h ep r e v i o u ss y s t e mi n t o :
where Λ * ≡ Λ ( * ),a n d 0 * ≡  0 ( * ), and where the nonlinearities write: (13) is obtained by substituting   =0in the linear parts of the first two equations of system (17) . We obtain:
where we recall that Λ * ≡ Λ ( * ),a n d 0 * ≡  0 ( * ) and where we introduce
The characteristic function of this system, denoted  (),i sd e fined such that  ()=det(I ()) where:
Thus:
To prove the lemma, we proceed in two steps. 1/ we show there exists a unique positive real root if  0 *  1 and that there is no positive real root if  0 * ∈ (0 1). 2/ we show there is no complex root with positive real parts.
1/ Real roots of  ()=0  Observe fir s tt h a ti f − Λ * ≥ 0 one has
2/ Complex roots of  ()=0  Let us denote the complex roots by  =  + .W efirst prove that there are no complex roots with positive real part that satisfy Λ * by showing that | ()|  0 For Λ *  one has:
Then, it is sufficient to observe that the right-hand-side of the above inequality is greater than  ()  0 to conclude. Let us now consider the roots whose real parts belong to (0 Λ * ). We are going to show that in this case:
Im ( ()) 0 One has:
Since:
one has:
Using the fact that (13) is obtained by substituting   =0in the linear parts of the fir s ta n dt h et h i r de q u a t i o n so f system (17) . We obtain:
which gives:
Let us define  ≡ Λ * . We restrict to the case   ≥  and proceed in two steps by showing: 1/ there exists one negative real root if  0 * ∈ (0 1) and no negative real root if  0 *  1; 2/ there are no complex roots with negative real parts.
1/ Real roots of  ()=0. Let us compute the derivative of (19): One has:
We co nc l ude t hat f or   ≥  , one has: | ()|  | ()|  0 ¤ P r o o fo fL e m m a5 . We s how t ha t f or Ω  small enough there exists one negative real root if  0 * ∈ (0 1) a n dn or oo tw i t hn e g a t i v er e a lp a r ti f 0 *  1.W e proceed in three steps:
1/ There is a unique real root to  ()=0that is negative if  ( 1−  ) we conclude there is one negative real root if  0 * ∈ (0 1) and either zero or two roots with negative real parts if  0 *  1. The condition that excludes roots with negative real parts is  0 (0)  0,o re q u i v a l e n t l y   Λ * h
